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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utah
ROGER FARRER, et al.,
~
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (
vs.

CASE
NO. 8076

VIVIAN D. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE

These three cases., civil numbered 16,935, 16,936, and
16,937, by stipulation of the parties, were consolidated for
trial and were tried jointly on December 15 and 16, 1952.
The plaintiffs in each of their respective amended complaints
claimed title to the described lands and sought to have title
quieted. In their respective answers the defendants denied
plaintiffs' claim of title to said lands and counterclaimed
in each case that they were the owners in possesion thereof. Defendants further claimed plaintiffs' respective actions
were barred by statutes of limitations. The court made and
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree in
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each case in favor of defendants. From these judgments
the plaintiffs have appealed. We will hereinafter refer to
appellants as plaintiffs and respondents as defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the trial it was undisputed that the land described
in each of plaintiffs' amended complaints adjoins the Utah
Lake Meander Line and extends South thereof to the water's edge of Utah Lake. Also, these lands border the lands
described in defendants' counterclaims which lie North of
said Meander Line. The disputed lands are popularly ·known
in this community as Utah Lake "accretion ground." (Defendants' Exhibit 2). (R. 69-70).
The disputed lands were never patented by the United
States of America or the State of Utah, and none of the
parties hereto deraign title from a patentee thereof. (Defendants' Exhibit 3) (R. 70, 71, 72 and 151).
The land to the North of the said Utah Lake Meander
Line was patented by the United States of America to one
Simon P. Eggertson in 1872. Defendants deraign title to
these patented grounds through mesne conveyances from
this patentee, as shown in the Abstracts received in evidence as defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5. The Abstract, Ex·
hibit -4, shows the descent of title to defendants in cases
16,935 and 16,936 in part, and the Abstract, defendants'
Exhibit 5, shows the descent of title to defendants in case
16,.93-6. in part and case 16,937. These patented lands now
owned and possessed by defendants lie immediately North,
and,. with the exception of a narrow strip along the Meander _Line, hereinafter noted, they immediately adjoin the
said accretion ground on the North. Defendants' predecessor, Simon P. Eggertson, conveyed most of these lands
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in defendants' chain of title November 6, 1873. Defendants' Exhibit 4, Entry 3, and Defendants' Exhibit 5, Entry
2). It should be noted that the Warranty Deed from Simon
P. Eggertson to George T. Peay, from which ploinaiffs attempt to deraign title, was dated June 16, 1883, some 10
years after the conveyance from the patentee to defendants' predecessor. Defendants described these patented
lands in the first paragraph of the descriptions contained
in their respective counterclaims. Defendants' lands are
platted within the red lines shown on dfendants' Exhibit 2,
and their relative position to the disputed lands is also there
shown.
As indicated above, the disputed lands lying adjacent
to defendants' said patented lands and South of the Meander Line extending to the water edge of the Lake are known
as "accretion ground." There has never been any United
States or Utah State patents issued covering these lands.
Plaintiffs seek to deraign title in each case, other than 16-,935, from Simon P. Eggertson, as patentee. Plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, C, Entries 1 and 2 of each). But the said E'ggertson Patent did not cover any of the lands described in
the said George T. Peay deed. (Defendants' Exhibit 3).
The lands described in this Eggertson-Peay deed all lie
South of the Meander Line, and were never patented at all.
Plaintiffs' claim is based principally upon tax titles in
each of their cases. The plaintiffs in cases 16,936 and 16,-.
937, after procuring their tax titles from Utah County, did
procure quit-claim deeds from the succesors to George T. ·
Peay, to whom the lands described in those cases were distributed in the George T. Peay probate proceedings. (Plain-·
tiffs' Exhibits B and C). But in 16,935 no such quit-claim
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deed was procured, and plaintiffs rely absolutely on the tax
title. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A).
The witness Maurice Bird, Utah County Treasurer, and
his uncontradicted evidence establishes that the assessment
rolls in his office, of which he is the official custodian, showing the tax sales on the properties described in the respective complaints for the years when the tax sales were made,
1930 through 1937, contain no Auditor's Affidavit and that
there was no evidence that any had ever been attached. (R.
192-105).
Plaintiffs made no claim in these suits to the lands lying North of the .Utah Lake Meander Line. There seems
to be a small strip of land lying immediately North of the
Meander Line and bounding defendants' patented ground
on the South which was not conveyed by Simon P. Eggertson to defendants' predecessors. (Defendants' Exhibit 2).
Title to this narrow strip still rests in the Simon P. Eggertson estate. But that it was understood to have been conveyed to defendants' predecessors is shown by an abortive
attempt to convey it in 1901 by the Simon P. E.ggertson
heirs to the defendants' predecessor, Thomas L. Vmcent.
(Defendants' Exhibit 7) (R. 138). In any event, defendants and their predecessors have always occupied this strip
along with their other lands. (R. 113-149).
Defendants and their predecessors in title have at all
times paid all the taxes levied and assessed against the patented part of their disputed lands. (R. 118 and 136) (Defendants' Exhibit 6). The accretion part, the disputed
lands, has never been assessed to them, and they had no
knowledge of the disputed lands being assessed for taxes to
any one until these lawsuits were commenced. (R. 118,
119, 137, 140-141). It is undisputed that comparable ac-
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cretion land in the same general area to the East of defendants' farm has never been assessed for taxation purposes.
Defendants and their predecessors have been in actual,
peaceable, open, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted
possession of the disputed lands under claim of title adverse
to all the world for more than seven years prior to the commencement of these actions, and for upwards of 50 years
prior thereto (R. 113-149); and that all during that period
defendants and their predecessors have fenced and maintained same, cultivated, cropped, and have made large expenditures theren for irrigation and drainage purposes.
The said lands lying between the Lake water edge and the
Meander Line constituted an average area of about 70 acres
during more than 50 years last past. (R. 11, 135). The
defendants and their predecessors during all of that period
have protected it by a substantial enclosure, cultivated and
improved it, and have expended labor and money on it for
irrigation purposes amounting to about $2,000.00, or about
$28.57 per acre. (R. 75-83, 87-90, 94-97, 106-113, 115-117,
130-135).
That defendants' predecessors, Thomas L. Vincent and
Ralph Vincent, his son, defended legal actions over the West
fence boundary line of the disputed lands, once in 1801,
which controversy was settled by agreement (Defendants'
Exhibit 4, Entry 13), once in 1942, where damages to crops
growing on the disputed accretion ground was recovered by
them (See Ralph Vincent v. Federal Land Bank, et al., Civil
No. 12,230, Trial Court), and also when one Jesse Evans was
put off the land when he attempted to assert a right under
a State of Utah lease in the 1930's. (R. 130, 132, 137).
All three of the plaintiffs' cases were filed February 4,
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1952, and neither the plaintiffs nor their prdecessors have
ever been in possession of same. (R. 4, 161, 181).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ERROR
IN FAILING TO QUIET TITLE TO THE LAN!D IN
QUESTION IN PLAINTIFFS.
(a) Th Tax Sale Proceedings In Each Of The Instant
Cases Were Fatally Defective Because The Required Audi-·
tor's Affidavit Was Never Attached To The Pertinent Assessment Rolls.
(b) Apart From The Void Tax Titles The Claims of
Plaintiffs In The Instant Cases Are Barred By The Provisions Of Our Law Requiring Them To Be "Seised Or Possessed Of The Property Within Seven Years Before The
Commencement Of Th-e Action''.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT DilD NOT COMMIT

ERROR BY FAILING TO FIND AND FORECLOSE
LIENS FOR TAXES PAID BY P~NTIFFS ON
THE LANDS IN QUESTION AFTER HOLDING THEIR
CLAIMED TAX TITLES VOIID.
POINT ITI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOIUND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND QUIETED
THEIR TITLE TO THE iDISPUTED LANDS.
(a) Defendants Record Title To Adjacent Patented
Lands Entitled Them To The Disputed Lands Under The
Accretion Doctrine.
(b) Defendants Acquired Title To The Disputed Lands
By Adverse Possession Thereof For Upwards Of 50 Year.s.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COiURT MADE NO ERROR
IN FAILING TO QUIET TITLE TO THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN PLAINTIFFS.
Upon this record, and there is no substantial dispute in
the evidence, it is defendants' position that the plaintiffs'
claim of title to the disputed land fails, and that defendants should be adjudged to be the owners thereof and their .
title quieted.
(a) The Tax Sale Proceedings In Each Of The Intant
Cases Were Fatally Defective Because The Required Auditor's Affidavit Was Never Attached To The Pertinent Assessment Rolls.
The plaintiffs' tax title to the disputed lands is bad in
each case, and their claims based thereon must fail. Tax
titles to be valid must be based on tax assessment and sale,
procedures strictly in accordance with the statutes providing thereor. Whoever sets up a tax title must show that
all the requirements of the law have been complied with.
Bolognese v. Anderson, et al., (1935) 87 U. 450, 44 P2d.
706, and other Utah cases cited in the .Utah Report at page
453. The Tax Deed made in accordance with the provisions
of either 59-10-64(5) or 59-10-62, U. C. A., 1953, is prima
facie evidence of al proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale. However, the Auditor's Affidavit required by
la\V to be attached to the assessment roll in which the tax
sale is recorded is a condition precedent to a valid Tax Deed
based thereon. Telonis v. Staley, et al., (1943) 104 U. 537,
at pages 544-5, 144 P2d. 514. Jenkins v. Morgan (1948)
113 U. 534, at page 540, 196 P2d. 871. In each of the instant cases it was proved conclusively from the evidence of
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Maurice Bird, the ,Utah County Treasurer, that no affidavit
was attached to the assessment rolls in which the tax sales
of any of plaintiffs' lands appear for the years 1930 through
1937, and there was no evidence that such affidavits had
been so attached. This evidence was held to be conclusive
in Jenkins v. Morgan; supra. In that case the-County Treasurer and his deputy testified they had examined all assessment rolls for 1917 and 1939 and found no Auditor's Affidavits attached thereto and no evidence of such affidavits
ever having been so attached. The court held that this Wlcontradicted evidence was sufficient to support a finding
that the affidavits were not attached to the assessment rolls
as required by law. A new presumption was here found to
have been established that officers will perform their duties
and if the document cannot be found where it ought to be
under the law, that the same never existed, the court say-·
ing, pages 541-2, Utah Report:
.
"The record shows the testimony of the County
Treasurer and his 'Deputy that they had examined all as..
sessment :rolls for 1917 and 1937 and had failed to find
· any auditor's affidavits attached thereto or any appearance of there ever having been any auditor's affidavits
so attached. This testimony stands uncontradicted and
under the rule adopted in Tree v. White, supra, the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the trial
court. In that case we adopted the rule found in Hall
v. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135, as follows.
"'The law prsumes that all officers entrusted with
the custody of public files and records, will perform
their official duty by keeping them safely in their offices. Where a paper is not found where, if in existence,
it ought to be deposited or recorded, the presumption
therefore arises that no such document has ever been .
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in existence: * * * Until this presumption ·'is rebutted, it must stand as proof of such non-existence' "
(171 P.2d 400) ."
It follows that the tax title in each of plaintiffs' cases
much fail because the Auditor's Affidavit was never attached
to. the pertinent assessment rolls ·as required by law.' ~nas7
much as plaintiffs do not claim title as having descended
to them from George T. Peay in connection with case 16,935, the failure of the tax title therein is ·conch.tsiv~ and precludes their recovery in that case.
.

.

'

(b) Apart From The Void Tax Titles The ClaiJ?S Of_
Plaintiffs In The Instant Cases Are Barred By The Provisions Of Our
Law Requiring Them roBe "Seised Or ' Pos,
.
sessed Of The Property Within Seven Years :Before The
CoQl~~ncenient .Of The Action." ·
.
. . .
.·
The plaintiffs' respective claims of title in these. suits
are barred by the provisions of the statute_ of limitations
hereinafter set forth. These are actions brought for the recovery of real property within the meaning of Sections 7812-5 and 6, U. C. A., 1953, which provide as follows:
. "No action for the recovery of .real property or for
the possession thereof shall be maintained, unle~s it
appears that .the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seized or posses?ed of the property in question \vithin seven years before the commencement of
the action."
"No cause of action, or defense or counter claim
. to an. action,, founded upon the title to real property or
to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual,
unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action,
or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under
whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or coun-
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terclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the prop.
erty in question within seven years 'before the committing of the act in respect to which such action is pr~
secuted or defense or counterclaim made."
Plaintiffs are barred under either or both of the foregoing sections for the reason that they have never been
"seised or possessed" of the property to which they seek
to quiet their title within seven years before the commencement of their actions or before the committing of the act
in respect to which the actions are prosecuted. The plaintiffs, nor their predecessors, have never been "seised or
possessed" within the meaning of these statutes. A person
with the bare legal title, to say nothing of void tax title, is
not seised or possessed as required ·by this law. In 38 Words
and Phrases, page 513, the term "seised" is defined, quoting a Minnesota case, as follows:
"The title of the owner of a freehold estate is described by the word 'seisin', or 'seisin in fee'; yet in a
proper legal sense the holder of the legal title is not
'seised' until he is fully invested with ·possession, actual
or constructive. When there is no adverse possession,
the title draws to it the possession. There can be but
one actual seisin, and this necessarily includes posses~
sion; and hence an actual possession in hostility to the
true owner works a disseisin. Thus, in a statute limiting the time for the commencement of actions to recover real property, unless the plaintiff was seised or
possessed of the premises within a certain time, the
term 'seised' is not used in contradistinction to 'possessed', so as to admit of an interpretation that the
legal title or ownership only would be sufficint to prevent the statute running as against the true o\vner,
though a stranger be in the. actual occupancy-'pedis
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possessione'-of the land in dispute. Seymour v. Carli,
16 N. W. 495, 31 Minn. 81."
The Minnesota case has been reaffirmed on this particular point in Mellenthin v. Brantman (1941) (Minn.) 1
N. W. 141, at page 143.
The ,Utah statute 78-12-7, U. C. A., 1953, cited by counsel (App. Br. 25) and Bank of Vernal v. Uintah County, et
al.,
U.
, 250 P2d. 581 (App. Br. 26) construing same in connection with 78-12-5 and 6, U. C. A.,
1953, affirm the rule of the foregoing Minnesota cases. Sylabus 5 of the Pacific report reflects the holding of the court
in the Bank of Vernal case, pages 581-2:

"In quiet title action brought by a bank which had
purchased involved realty at mortgage foreclosure sale.
and was entitled to presumption of possession under
statutory provision that in action for recovery or realty or possession thereof, person establishing legal title
shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within time required by law, and that occupancy thereof by
another shall be deemed to have been in subordination
to legal title, unless realty has been held and possessed
adversely to legal title for seven years prior to commencement of action, defendant's evidence was insufficient to rebut presumption of possession which inured
to bank. U. C. A .. , 1943, 104-2-5 to 104-2-7."
In the instant cases there could be no presumption of
title in the owner under 78-12-7 because "it appears that the
property had been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of the action." Indeed, on this record such adverse possession existed for upwards of 50 years before this action was commenced.
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The record in the instant cases shows that neither the
plaintiffs nor any of their predeeessots have ever· been seised
or possessed of the disputed lands at any time. Their
claims, ther~fore, are barred by ·the foregoing limitations
statutes.
·
POINT ll. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
·ERROR BY FAILING TO FIND AND FORECLOSE
LIENS FOR TAXES PAID BY PLAINTIFFS ON
THE LANDS IN QUESTION. AFTER HOILDING THEIR
CLAIMED. ·TAX TITLES VOID.
In their brief plaintiffs are claiming that they are entitled to a lien upon the disputed lands for amounts paid
Utah County for same and rely upon 59-10-65, U. C. A.,
1953, asking that· same be foreclosed if the Court finds their
tax titles bad. We beiieve this contention it a tacit admission of defend~nts' position that plaintiffs' tax titles are invalid.. However, it .is our contention, despite 59-10-65, that
plaintiffs have no .tax lien against these-lands, and consequently there is nothing to be foreclosed. Let's briefly examine this statute and its backgr~imd.
Section 59-10-65, U. ·C. A., 1953, was passd by the 1951
Legislature (L. 1951, Ch. 96) as a ne\v Section 80-10-68.1
in U. C. A., 1943, and it provides as follows:
"Every person who has purchased or shall hereafter purchase any invalid tax title to any real property in this state shall front the effective date .of this
act have a lien against such property for the recovery.
o~ the antount of the purchase price paid to _the courity.
therefor to the extent that the county would have a·
lien prior to the sale by the county, but in no event
shall the lien be greater than the amount of taxes, in-
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terest, and penalties, or the amount actually paid
whichever is smaller; provided however, taxes paid by
the purchaser for subsequent years after the purchase
from the county shall be included in the amount secured by said lien, which has not already been recovered. Such lien shall have the same priority against
such property as the lien for the delinquent taxes which
were liquidated by such purchase except that it shall
not have preference over any right, title or interest in
or against such property acquired since the purchase
of such tax title and prior to the effective date of this
section for value and without notice and such lien shall
bear interest at the legal rate for a period of not to exceed four years. Such lien shall be foreclosed in any
action wherein the validity of such tax title is determined. If such lien is not foreclosed at the time of the
determination of the invaldity of such tax title, any
later action to foreclose such lien shall be forever
(barred), provided that where such determination was
made prior to the effective date of this section such
action may be commenced at any time within one year
after such effective date.''
This section was apparently passed to ehange the law
announced by our Supreme Court in Anson v. Ellison, -104
U. 576, 140 P2d. 653. In that case the plaintiff purchased
an invalid tax title for $275.58 and took conveyance by quitclaim deed from Salt Lake County. The tax title being
held bad, plaintiff claimed a lien for the amount she had
paid the county and a.Sked that it be foreclosed. The trial
court denied the relief and on appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed, saying, among other things: (Pacific Report, 655)
"We seriously doubt in any event that the plaintiff
could turn this action to quiet title into an action to
foreclose a lien, but we lay aside this procedural ques-
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tion and tum to the merits of plaintiff's argument. As
already pointed out, it is doubtful that the stipulation
that a certificate of sale had been issued is sufficient
to show a valid levy and assessment, and a valid lien
will not arise from an invalid levy and assessment. Although it may be that when a tax is subsequently properly levied the lien may relate back to the first of January of the year that proper levy should have been
made.''
We seriously doubt that the foregoing statute can convert and change a suit-to-quiet-title into an action to foreclose a tax lien without doing violence to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. In a.ily event, after giving this section full effect, it does not give plaintiffs the
right to foreclose tax liens in the instant case. It should
be noted that the said law contains the provision that every person who purchases an invalid tax title:
''. . . shall · . . . have a lien against such
propety for the recovery of the amount of the purchase price paid· to the county therefor to the extent
that the county would have a lien prior to the sale by
the COWlty . • • ."
Th~s,

plaintiffs' right to a lien is conditioned on whether
or not the county had a lien prior to the sale to them and
only to that extent. The nature and extent of the county's
tax lien is provided for in 59-10-3, U. C. A., 1953, as follows:
''Every tax upon real property is a lien against
the property assessed; and every tax due upon improvements upon real estate assessed to others than the
owner of real estate is a lien upon the land and improvements; which several liens attach as of the 1st
day in January of each year."
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In Anson v. Ellison, supra, this section was interpreted
and it was there held that "a valid lien will not arise from
an invalid levy and assessment." Only lands that are lawfully assessed give rise to valid tax liens. The disputed lands
were not lawfully assessed, and even if all levy and assessment steps had been taken, as provided by law, no tax lien
could possibly arise in favor of the county, or at all. As
was held in Plutus Mining Co. v. O.rme, 76 U. 286, 289 P.
132, where the assessed property was not within the limits
of the taxing authority the assessment is unlawful and invalid. As already indicated above, the disputed lands were
unpatented Utah Lake accretion lands. The first assessment ever made thereon seems to have been for the year
1914 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, and C), indicating that
some 30 years elapsed after the conveyance of Simon P. Eggertson to George T. Peay before an attempt to assess them
was made. The land described in the said Eggertson-Peay
deed seems to be the only accretion ground ever to be assessed in the area. This is perhaps because either (1) it
was supposed to be United States land, or (2) it was thought
to be U'tah State land, or (3) it was accretion ground and
not productive because submerged so much of the time.
When Utah became a state its inhabitants disclaimed all
right, title, and interest in unappropriated public lands within its boundary, leaving such lands in the ownership of the
United States. (Constitution of Utah, Article ill, Second).
The property of the United States, or of this State, is ex;.
empt from taxation. (59-2-1, U. C. A., 1953). These disputed lands were unappropriated public lands, and the Eggertson attempt to convey them to Peay was abortive and
a nullity, as was the subsequent attempt to assess and tax
same. Utah County acquired no lien by virtue of t})e in-
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valid proceedings in these cases. Therefore, the plaintiffs'
liens claimed under 59-10-65 must fail.
POINT III. THE TRIAL CO·URT CO·RRECTLY
FOUND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND QUIETED
THEIR TITLE TO THE DISPUTED LANDS.
(a) Defendants' Record Title To Adjacent Patented
Lands Entitled Them To The iDisputed Lands Under The
Accretion Doctrine.
It is undisputed that the defendants have the record
titl~ to the patented lands lying North of the Meander Line
and ~h the North boundary of the disputed lands. Title to
same has descended to defendants by mesne conveyances
from Simon P. Eggertson, patentee. We take the position
that such ownership carried with it ownership of the accretion lands to the high water mark at Statehood. Provo City
v. Jacobson,
U. __~, 217 P2d. 577. No one makes
a claim here, nor is there any proof, that the State had title
to the disputed lands at Statehood. Therefore, the defendants ·by reason of their ownership of the patented lands own
the disputed lands to the water's edge. The above mentioned Eggertson's heirs deed shows their recognition of
defendants' and their predecessor,s' patented ground title
to the Meander Line. Thus, defendants' record title to the
said patented ground amply sustains their right to the ownership of the disputed lands.
(b) Defendants Acquired Title To The Disputed Lands
By Adverse Possession Thereof For Upwards Of 50 Years.
But apart from their said record ownership of the disputed _lands, defendants have acquired title thereto by adverse possession. The defendants' predecessor, Tho1nas L.
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Vincent, took possession of the disputed lands under written instruments in 1884, 1892, and 1898 (Defendants' Exhibit 4, Entry 5, and Exhibit 5, Entries 5 and 6), and ever
since then he and his successors in title, including the defendants, have continuously occupied same under claim of
right, fenced, cultivated, cropped, pastured, and adversely
held same against all the \Vorld and paid all taxes lawfully
assessed against same. All the requirements as to adverse
possession under written instruments, as provided for in
Section 78-12-9, U. C. A., 1953, have been met and complied
with by the defendants and their predecessors for more
than seven years before the filing of the defendants' counterclaims. Indeed, for upwards of 50 years the defendants
and their predecessors (1) have usually cultivated and improved the disputed lands and (2) have built and protected
same by a substantial enclosure.
Also, the defendants and their predecessors have met
all requirements as to adverse possesion, even if their claim
were not founded upon a written instrument, as required
by Section 78-12-11, U. C. A., 1953. The record shows that
the defendants and their predecessors for upwards of 50·
years have (1) protected the disputed lands in their possession by a substantial enclosure consisting of fences, (2) that
all during said period these lands have been usually cultivated and improved by them, and (3) labor and money have
been expended for the purpose of irrigating and draining
the said lands in a sum amounting to more than $5.00 per
acre, as hereinabove shown.
Also, the defendants have fully complied with the provisions of Section 78-12-12, U. C. A., 1953, which provides
as follows:
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~·rn

no .case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any section of this
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied
and assessed upon such land according to law."
The defendants and their predecessors have continuously and adversely possessed the disputed lands for more
than seven years, as required by the furegoing statute.
Furthermore, they have paid all taxes levied and assessed
against the same ''according to law'', as required thereby.
There is no provision in our law which permits assessment
of unpatented lands belonging either to the ,United States
or the State of Utah. Indeed, the Utah Lake accretion
groimds generally, other than the George T. Peay lands,
have never been assessed for taxation purposes, and as
shown by the evidence in. this case, the same are still not
assessed or taxed. The theory is that due to the rise and
fall .of the waters of the Lake the accretion lands are extremely uncertain as to their utility value. The record in
the instant case shows that they are presently completely .
submerged by the water of the lake. Over the years the
assessment and taxing of the patented ground adjacent
thereto is all that is required of those who possess the accretion lands bordering same. The fact that an assessment
was made against the disputed lands does not make such
assessment valid, and, in fact, results in unlawful assessment. If taxes were not lawfully assessed against these
lands, then the adverse claimant is not required by the foregoing section to pay such taxes and may acquire title with-
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out doing so.

Utah Copper v. Chandler (1914) 45 U. 85,

142 P. 1119.
CONCLUSION

The trial court committed no error in making its findings, conclusions, and decree in favor of defendants. It is
abundantly clear from the record in each of the instant
cases that the claims of the plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations, as above set forth. But apart from that,
the plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence, or at all, any record title in themselves. It is further established by this record that the plaintiffs' claimed
tax titles are invalid. And, finally, the disputed lands were
never assessable. Utah Connty never became entitled to tax
liens thereon. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled
to liens for the amounts paid the County for same. The
evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the defendants
own the disputed lands (1) because they are the record
owners of the patented grounds to which the disputed lands
attach, and (2) if such were not the fact, defendants have
acquired title to same by adverse possession. Defendants
have been rightfully adjudged by the lower court to be the
owners of the said lands and to have their title thereto
quieted, and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
GEORGE S. BALLIF,

Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
Suite 211, Knight Block,
Provo, ·Utah.
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